INTRODUCTION
Medical boards license and discipline physicians pursuant to statutory authority in each state. 1 The precise structure and function of these boards varies although the vast majority of them share certain characteristics: ( 1) they include non-physician members but are dominated by physicians; (2) they frequently combine investigative, prosecutorial, and judicial duties; (3) their decisions are subject to judicial review under a very deferential standard; and ( 4) they can apply an array of sanctions upon a finding of "unprofessional conduct." 2 The definition ofunprofessional conduct differs from state~to state. It commonly includes criminal activity that relates to professional attributes, incompetence, impairment from drugs or alcohol, and gross negligence. 3 Scholars' observations about medical boards ventured over a decade ago remain true today:
Given the importance of[ their] tasks, it is surprising that very little is known about how well boards are able to perform them. Most discussions about the effectiveness of medical boards have been based on counts of disciplinary actions (e.g., number of revocations, suspensions and probations imposed per one thousand physicians), which do not give us a full picture ofboard activity. Very little is known about who complains to medical boards, how allegations of incompetence or unprofessional conduct are investigated, and convincing proof (metaphorically speaking, say, a seventy-five percent probability of guilt). 7 The American Medical Association ("AMA") is generally supportive of civil rights, including due process oflaw for physicians, 8 but it has not taken a position on the question of which standard of proof should apply in disciplinary proceedings. Perhaps the AMA is preoccupied with the admittedly important question of medical malpractice suits. It is also likely that organized medicine is hesitant to push for greater protections in disciplinary proceedings because oflikely complaints from some quarters of catering to its members', rather than the public's, interests. It is time for physicians and persons concerned with basic fairness and good public policy to focus on this important issue. Greater protections for physicians are consistent with both public interests and physicians' rights, and, considering both the magnitude and probability ofliability, the overall risks to physicians are of similar import in the medical malpractice and disciplinary contexts.
Physicians are about a third as likely to be convicted of professional misconduct reportable to the National Practitioner Data Bank as they are to have to make a reportable medical malpractice payment. 9 Although the likelihood of a reportable misconduct conviction is less, the magnitude of the harm is arguably greater. Misconduct proceedings can cost tens (rarely, hundreds) of thousands of dollars in legal fees, are sometimes covered by limited or no insurance; are not graced by all the protections attendant to liability suits (e.g, hearsay evidence is commonly accepted), 10 and can lead to professional death via license revocation. Similarly, while the number of malpractice payouts has been fairly stable for a number of years, 12 This increase is likely due at least in part to continued demands that disciplinary boards-which are themselves judged by the number and severity of convictions they achieve-deal more severely with physicians. 13 The grave risks associated with disciplinary proceedings are such that one might expect that the proceedings would be subject to not just the clear and convincing evidence standard, but the beyond a reasonable doubt standard which is constitutionally required in criminal cases. To the contrary, however, the history of the standard ofproofin disciplinary proceedings is largely one of embrace of the preponderance standard and an unsophisticated and sometimes completely erroneous understanding of the dynamics and realities ofboard proceedings in the various states. For example, in late 1990 the Inspector General of the United States published, State Medical Boards And Medical Discipline. This report erroneously claimed that "most boards must base any disciplinary actions they take on a 'clear and convincing' standard of proof," attributing its statement to unnamed Federation of State Medical Boards ("FSMB") personnel and "discussions with board officials in many states." 14 A state-by-state review of the standard of proof published in 1992 found, however, that only fifteen states utilized the clear and convincing standard. 15 This was confirmed in 1993 by the FSMB in the first of what are now biennial tables on the issue contained in its publication, The Exchange. 16 The Inspector General's 1990 Report recognized that the higher standard "provides greater protection for physicians," but found this protection not to be justified because of the standard's supposed interference with "the boards' capacity to review cases expeditiously and effectively." 17 The Report did not provide support for its conclusions and was thus willing to sacrifice physicians' rights based on speculation. Its cavalier attitude toward due process was out-of-date even then, but nevertheless reflects a posture that has endured concerning the standard of proof and medical discipline. For example, the FSMB continues to endorse the preponderance standard using the same reasoning "informing" the Inspector General's 1990 Report,l 8 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirements would entail. 20 Although subsequent to Mathews several state courts have addressed physician disciplinary proceedings and which standard of proof is required by either federal and state constitutional protections or wise choice, many of these divergent opinions are conclusory and, although there are some wellreasoned opinions, none covers all the relevant legal; moral, and policy issues. 21 Similarly, a lack of rigor marks the limited amount of The reasonable doubt standard is a cornerstone of American jurisprudence, reflecting that we prefer to allow many guilty persons to escape conviction before tolerating even one person being erroneously punished. It recognizes that conviction invariably blights a person's reputation, usually considerably limits one's life opportunities even to the extent of often taking away physical liberty, can involve but does not require either the existence or initiative of a victim, can involve but does not require compensation to an adverse party, and involves a uniquely powerful opponent. Conversely, general use of the preponderance standard in civil proceedings reflects that here the government is an arbiter between contending parties as to whom there · generally is no reason for allocating any other than the minimum possible disparity of risk of error in decision making. 27 . Finally, the reasonable doubt standard conveys that the foregoing values and considerations outweigh the purposes that might be served by convictions that would be obtained under a lesser standard of proof: deterring the offender from future misconduct, deterring other potential offenders, rehabilitation~ incapacitation of the offender (e.g., by confinement or monitoring), or meting out just deserts. This conclusion reflects a hesitance to use persons as mere means to governmental ends and a favoring of justice over utility.
The reasoning favoring the criminal standard applies almost uniformly to disciplinary cases. Disciplinary cases are brought by a governmental body and might involve, but do not require, either the existence of, initiative of, or payment to a victim. The goals are the same. as in criminal proceedings: deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation, or just punishment. Conviction invariablyblightsaprofessional'sreputationandcandestroyone'scareerand life. Although disciplinary proceedings do not lead to confinement or brand one a criminal, most professionals would probably prefer a criminal conviction and at least some jail time to the deStruction of a career implicit in serious disciplinary action. Consider, for example, the case discussed in the next subsection (in which the disciplinary board utilized the preponderance standard). This case is not offered to contend that disciplinary proceedings are typically corrupt. As with so many factual questions raised as to the functioning of di~ciplinary boards, there is no good empirical evidence as to either their proper functioning or the accuracy of their findings. Therefore, the case is offered solely as an example of how disciplinary proceedings can result in grave and unjust consequences for physicians. The mere existence of such risks is significant because, as will be further explored below, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that matters of justice and principle, as opposed to . utilitarian concerns, should predominate when determining the proper standard of proof.
Disciplinary proceedings can involve relatively minor charges and lead to light sanctions. One might argue that a preponderance standard would be 27 . Id. at 371-372 (Justice Harlan's concwring opinion).
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CONSTITUTIONAlLY MANDATED STANDARD OF PROOF 115 appropriate in such proceedings. This is a possibility, but any benefits this approach might lead to would have to be balanced against confusion that might result if medical board personnel untrained in law were asked to apply different standards of proof depending on the severity of the charges or potential sanctions involved in each proceeding. Moreover, professional reputations are threatened regardless of the level of"unprofessional conduct" at issue. [T]he Board wielded its power to ruin the career of an outspoken physician while simultaneously protecting a possibly negligent or incompetent practitioner who had questionable billing procedures. Although only one patient had complained about Dr. Mishler, and that complaint was subsequently found to be unjustified, the Board purposely scrutinized Dr. Mishler's charts to find evidence with which to discipline Dr. Mishler. The Board timed its proceedings against Dr. Mishler to limit the evidence available to him for his defense, because WMC's retention policy operated to destroy important films. Also; while the Board used its own rules of confidentiality as an excuse to obstruct Dr. Mishler Addington makes yet a further distinction: It observes while the interest of the individual may dictate a higher standard of proof to avoid erroneous deprivation, important interests of the state are likewise vindicated by the higher burden ....
B. A Case
By the same token society also has the important dual interests that (1) Dr. Nguyen's standard of practice not fall below the acceptable minimum and (2) he not be erroneously deprived his license, as that would erroneously deprive the public access to and· benefit from his services. Here each interest dictates a more exacting burden than mere preponderance. 34 
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On the other hand, cases holding that the preponderance standard is constitutionally sufficient either ignore the importance of the private interests, erroneously imply that mere property interests are at stake, or incorrectly reason that only permanent deprivations or intrusions on fundamental rights can require a higher standard. 35 The position that only intrusions on fundamental rights can justify the clear and convincing evidence test not only ignores controlling procedural due process opinions such ·as Addington v.
Texas , 36 but also misapplies substantive due process doctrine to the procedural due process context. 37. Substantive due process doctrine provides that strict scrutiny in the form of the compelling state interest test will apply if there is a substantial intrusion on a fundamental right, but procedural due process analysis determines the degree of protections necessary by comparing the respective ~overnmental and private interests involved without a predetermined threshold concerning the nature or weight of the governmental interest. The possible exception is that Court opinions have stated that enhanced procedural protections are only indicated when private interests greater than money are involved, but this is far short of requiring a 
ffi. RISKS OF ERRONEOUS DEPRIVATIONS

A. Who Has The Burden Of Proof Regarding The Standard Of Proof
The second prong of the Mathews test focuses on the degree of risk of erroneous decision making. There are multiple factors that portend error in board proceedings if they are conducted under a mere preponderance standard. However, it must be admitted that there are no empirical studies that demonstrate that the preponderance standard will result in more erroneous convictions than would occur if the clear and convincing standard were used. 38 This raises an important question regarding who has the burden of proof concerning the factual issues that arise when one attempts to apply the Mathews test. Such issues include the magnitude of the risk of erroneous deprivations when the preponderance standard is used, the degree of amelioration of the risk of· error that would occur under the clear and convincing standard, and the nature and amount of state interests that might be sacrificed under the clear and convincing standard.
The Supreme Court has not clarified who has the burden of proof regarding questions raised by application of the Mathews test. One might argue that the party asserting violation of procedural due process should have the burden of proving the facts necessary to establish her claim. 39 There is a strong indication from the Court's opinions, however, that the burden of proof concerning the standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings should be placed on the government and/or that matters of individual justice should predominate over utilitarian or societal concerns when striking the ultimate balance dictated by the test. an effect in a given criminal law context], but we have found no study comparing all three standards of proof to determine how juries real or mock, apply them" (Bracketed material added). 39. One might counter that at least substantive due process or equal protection claims involving values stronger than mere property interests commonly involve establishing a deprivation of or intrusion on a right or interest, followed by application of a standard of review to determine whether the deprivation or intrusion was justified, for example, by "due process." Here the individual has the burden of proving the interest and the deprivation or intrusion, but the government commonly has the burden of justifying the deprivation or intrusion once it is established.
40 The expanding concern of society with the problems of mental disorders is reflected in the fact that in recent years many states have enacted statutes designed to protect the rights of the mentally ill. However, only one state by statute permits involuntary commitment by a mere preponderance of the evidence [citation], and Texas is the only state where a court has concluded that the preponderance-of-the-evidence . standard satisfies due process. We attribute this not to any lack of concern in those states, but rather to a belief that the varying standards tend to produce comparable results. As we noted earlier, however, standards of proof are important for their symbolic meaning as well as for their practical effect. 41 In the quoted passage, the Court finds that although there are no empirical studies, and perhaps none that could be conducted or designed, that demonstrate that the risk of erroneous commitments will be ameliorated by use of a standard stronger than the usual civil preponderance standard, this is not a reason to find against the appellant's constitutional claim to an intermediate standard.
Similarly, it seems to find that appellant's constitutional claim should not be rejected just because there might be little or no difference in the outcomes under either standard. This is because of the important symbolic value of embracing respect for individual liberty. [Vol. 3:103 The Court made further observations that indicate its apparent presumption in favor of an elevated standard of proof. It stated, for example:
In considering. what standard should govern in a civil commitment proceeding, we must assess both the extent of the individual's interest in not being involuntarily confined indefinitely and the state's interest in committing the emotionally disturbed under a particular standard of proof.
The state has a legitimate interest under its parens patriae powers in providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves; the state also has authority under its police power to protect the community from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally ill. Under the Texas Mental Health Code, however, the State has no interest in confining individuals involuntarily if they are not mentally ill or if they do not pose some danger to themselves or others. Since the preponderance standard creates the risk of increasing the number of individuals erroneously committed, it is at least unclear to what extent, if any, the state's interests are furthered by using a preponderance standard in such commitment proceedings. 42 Here the Court does not discount the individuat•s interest by considering only the additional risk posed by use of a preponderance standard instead of a clear and convincing standard. It does limit the state's interest to the extent it .is implicated ''under a particular standard of proof. •• It also seems to place a burden of actual proof on the state when it discounts the state's interest by observing that "it is at least unclear to what extent, if any, the state's interests are furthered by using a preponderance standard .... "
The Court also. reasoned: "Moreover, we must be mindful that the function of legal process is to minimize the risk of erroneous decisions.'"' 3 Here the Court seems to be stating that the Mathews test is to be applied in a manner that favors the overall goal of nrinimizing erroneous deprivations of individual rights.
The Court further observed:
At one· time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior which might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable. 
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CONSTITUTIONAlLY MANDATED STANDARD OF PROOF Obviously, such behavior is no basis for compelled treatment and surely none for confinement. However, there is the possible risk that a factfinder might decide to commit an individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct. Loss of liberty calls for a showing that the individual suffers from something more serious than is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior. Increasing ·the burden of proof is one way to impress the factfmder with the importance of the decision and thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that inappropriate commitments will be ordered. 44 
121
In the just quoted language the Court considers significant the mere possibility that the elevated, clear and convincing standard will ameliorate the risk of erroneous deprivations. As pointed out above, however, it was not willing to consider significant the possibility that the state • s interests might be placed at risk by the use of that standard. Rather, it discounted that possibility by stating: "it is at least unclear to what extent, if any, the state's interests are furthered by using a preponderance standard in such commitment proceedings. " 45 Finally, the Court flatly stated: "The individual should not be asked to share equally with society the risk of error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly greater than any possible harm to the state.'>46 The actual harm to the individual is the incremental harm of confmement and stigma, if any, posed by use of the preponderance, rather than the clear and convincing, standard. The actual harm to the state includes the incremental risk, if any, of physical harm to persons and property because of a failure to commit a dangerous person because of use of the clear and convincing, rather than the preponderance, standard. In the abstract, the relative interests on both sides seem to be of comparable value. The Court's finding that the individual's interest is clearly superior can only be logically explained by the Court implicitly placing upon the state the burden of proving the relative risks and/or the Court giving great weight to a moral principle against allowing erroneous deprivations of individual rights. places on individual liberty" and that an elevated standard is constitutionally required when the individual faces "a significant deprivation of liberty" or "stigma.'"' 9 It also distinguished Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 5° where it had held that a parent's right to counsel in parental rights termination proceedings would be determined case-by-case. 51 The reasoning in Lassiter was that the Court bad created a presumption against a right to counsel in cases not involving possible confinement. This reasoning was found not to apply to other procedural due process contexts such as determination of the proper standard of proof.
Although the Court did not explicitly say this, it can be argued to logically follow that, in the absence of a presumption against a claim to greater procedural protections, the burden of proof must then logically be placed on the government if there is to be a non-arbitrary way for decision makers to resolve a case when there is equipoise in the decision maker's mind concerning important factual questions. Once again, the Santosky Court seemed to exercise such a presumption in favor of an intermediate standard of proof in its observations just quoted above. The same presumption seems implicit in the Santosky Court's further observation: "At the factfinding, the State cannot presume that a child and his parents are adversaries. After the State has established parental unfitness at that initial proceeding, the court may assume at the dispositional stage that the interest of the child and the natural parents do diverge. " 52 The State could argue that it has an interest in preventing erroneous failures to find parental unfitness because they might result in serious harm to children. The Court, however, ignores such a point and discounts the State's asserted interest while not discounting the individual's interest.
If the Court's opinions in Addington and Santosky are not considered controlling concerning placement of the burden of proof, for guidance one can tum to factors authorities consider relevant when determining the proper placement of burdens of proof. These include placing the burden of proof on the party who: (1) asserts the disputed proposition; (2) the present context, for example, one can argue: (1) either that a physician asserts a procedural violation or that the government asserts that deprivation of a liberty interest is justified by sufficient due process in the form of a hearing based on a preponderance of the evidence; (2) either that the government is attempting to change the status quo in which the physician is in good standing or that the physician is attempting to change the status quo which includes use of a preponderance standard; (3) either the physician has greater access to evidence concerning her own conduct or that the government has access to data concerning the effect of different standards of proof; and ( 4) either that the individual asserts a paramount interest in practicing her profession and avoiding stigma or the government has a superior interest in protecting the public. We will not attempt to resolve these disputes, but two points are clear. First, disciplinary proceedings usually involve interactions with alleged victims. The victims and the physicians have relevant evidence. Even if a victim has died, there will usually be either surviving relatives, other medical personnel, or. written records that are accessible to the government.
Moreover, the government has superior resources and access to data necessary to perform any empirical studies that might provide insight into the effects of different standards of proof. Second, the Supreme Court has found that the individual's interests in avoiding adverse action and stigma, especially that associated with a finding of misconduct, along with the moral principle of avoiding erroneous serious deprivations outweigh the government's interest in proving by a mere preponderance of the evidence, as opposed to an intermediate standard, that a person is dangerous. These two points favor placing the burden of proof on the government.
B. Practical Or Logical Factors Relevant To Proving Risks Of E"oneous Deprivations
Regardless of which party ought to have the burden of proof, there are several practical or logical factors that indicate physicians could meet the burden of proving that a clear and convincing standard is constitutionally required. The burden of proof is not a requirement that a party establish that factual contentions are more likely than not according to formal social science, statistical analyses. To the contrary, the burden of proof refers to the subjective level of certainty that the decision maker must reach. 54 If one party presents several practical or logical arguments that are sufficient to allow the decision maker to reach the required subjective level of certainty in light of · any contrary arguments made by the other party, then the burden ofproofhas been met. We will now turn to these several practical or logical considera· tions regarding proof of risk of erroneous deprivations. 
External pressures on medical boards pose a risk of bias in favor of conviction.
The media, governmental officials, and consumer interest groups put pressure on medical boards to secure convictions; they judge boards by the number of convictions boards secure proportionate to the number of physicians boards have jurisdiction over. This is exampled by Public Citizen's Health Research Group's annual rankings of boards according to how many .. serious disciplinary actions" they secure per 1,000 physicians. 5 5 Although the FSMB contends that such statistics should not be used to compare boards, it publishes a yearly Composite Action Index based on the number and severity of convictions by which boards can judge their own performance over time. 56 FSMB 's concession that its members should judge their progress by the number of convictions they secure comes close to an admission that boards' comparative performance should be similarly judged.
Given further that the FSMB is devoted to enhancing the functioning of its member boards, it is not surprising that it supports use of the preponderance standard with nothing other than the speculation that it makes the job of protecting the public easier. 57 It also seems to follow that the boards are likely to reflect the same attitudes, judge their own progress by convictions, and therefore be subject to bias in favor of convictions. This is one of the reasons that, in 200 l, the Washington Supreme Court held· that its Board's use of the preponderance standard violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, observing:
The risk of erroneous deprivation is .
•. aggravated when one recalls the ultimate standard of conduct the Commission applies is almost entirely subjective in nature: ineompetency, negligence, malpractice, moral turpitude, dishonesty, and corruption were the claims upon which the Commission based its discipline of Dr. Nguyen .... It is difficult to imagine a more subjective and relative standard than that applied in a medical discipline proceeding where the minimum standard of care is often determined by opinion, and necessarily so. 58 Other courts have claimed that :m.iltters of discipline involve objective medical facts as to which physician board members have special expertise, thus indicating a minimum risk of erroneous creprivations. 59 The Court also explained that the preponderance standard exacerbates the risk of erroneous decision ID8ljng by falsely implying. that the focus should be on the respective amounts ("preponderance"), rather than quality, of evidence. 68
Court appeals do not significantly reduce the risk of board e"or.
This is because the standard or degree of review exercised by the courts is very limited. The specific articulations of the standard of review vary somewhat, but they all essentially reduce to the reality that courts will only overturn board findings if they are irrational. 69 Even then courts usually do not substitute their own decisions, but simply remand for further proceedings. Correcting an erroneous board decision is almost impossible and extremely expensive. The Washington Supreme Court recognized this in its Nguyen decision: "Moreover, with respect to the risk of erroneous deprivation in this proceeding, there is little solace to be found in the availability of judicial review which is high on ·deference but low on correction of errors . . . . Problems inherent in an interest-depriving procedure are ... only compounded when the possibilities for factual review are extremely limited. " 70 67. Santosky The third prong of the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test requires consideration of the nature and weight of the government's interests and the extent to which they are at riskunder the contending procedural alternatives. The paramount governmental interest commonly argued to be threatened by utilization of the clear and convincing standard is "protection of the public." "Protection of the public" has a powerful ring, but it is almost as amorphous and easy to abuse as the concept of "national security." The former (1990) Inspector General, the FSMB, and some court decisions· take positions concerning the appropriate standard of proof that consist of nothing other than an invocation of this interest and an assumption that it is powerful enough to trump any possible competing interest such as physicians' rights. 71 The Court's opinions in Addington and Santosky preclude any such conclusory resolution concerning the appropriate standard of proof. They require a careful explanation of various governmental interests, which standard each interest seems to favor, and the relative extents to which each interest is at risk under the contending standards of review. The government's interests include: ( 1) protecting the public from physical, financial, or psychological injury resulting from physician "misconduct"; (2) preserving existing physician-patient relationships and general public access to physicians; (3) generally maintaining the integrity of, and respect for, the civil justice system; (4) specifically fostering public security and respect for the law through the symbolic statement that our society will not tolerate a significant risk of erroneous deprivations when interests more important than money are at risk, especially in proceedings that entail accusation, adjudication, and punishment upon conviction; (5) avoiding administrative inconvenience and pecuniary expenses that might be associated with enhanced procedural protections; and ( 6) fostering respect for the medical profession. Only interests (1) and (5) in the foregoing list, if actually at issue, clearly favor use of the preponderance standard, while only interests (2) and (4) are obviously best protected by use of the clear and convincing standard. Interest (3) is closely associated with interest ( 4) and would thus seem to favor use of the clear and convincing evidence standard. 72 71. Kusserow, supra note 14 at I; Gandhi, 483 N. W.2d at 305. 72. One could argue that erroneous board decisions exonerating physicians could undercut the integrity of the civil justice system, but this seems highly unlikely. What little evidence there is in the published literature indicates that complainants are given little feedback concerning what actions boards take. Jost, supra note 1 at 333 ("Of the 200 public complaints studied, only 7 complainants received individualized letters from the Board responding to the specific allegations made in their compliant. A further 141 (70.5%) were sent a standard form letter drafted by the Board at the close of the case. A staggering 26% (52) got no reply at all."). What is much more likely is that physicians erroneously convicted would come to disrespect the system and use whatever status they maintained to inform others about the injustices. Finally, Interest ( 6) is often supported by the argument that the public will respect the medical profession only ifit diligently polices itself. This would favor use of the preponderance standard because that standard portends easier convictions. On the other hand, it can be argued that the medical profession's general embrace of the preponderance standard eVidences a willingness to curry uninformed public favor by tolerating a significant risk that convictions will be the result of public pressure rather than careful decision making. It could be said to reflect a willingness to destroy individual physicians' lives, careers, and reputations even when there is a forty-nine percent chance that charges are false. It embraces utility, not justice; image, not integrity. In this perspective, maintaining respect for the medical profession would best be achieved by embrace of the clear and convincing standard. Although there can be disputes regarding which standard the various.interests seem to favor in the abstract, it is clear that some of them actually support use of the clear and convincing, as opposed to the preponderance, standard.
Having delineated the government's interest$ and which standard they seem to favor in the abstract, we will turn to a closer examination of the interests and the extent to which they are actually at risk under the contending standards.
A. Interests That Can Be Claimed To Favor The Preponderance Standard
When public protection is mentioned, the first thought that occurs is protecting patients from physical.or psychological harm caused by substandard clinical care. As indicated above, however, most board proceedings do not even involve issues o( clinical care, but, rather, alleged. abuse of drugs or alcohol. 73 It is true that physicians with an addiction problem might become incompetent clinicians. Regardless, there is no good evidence that medical disciplinary proceedings offer significant protection to patients from substandard clinical care beyond that already afforded by a panoply of alternative regulatory mechanisms: criminal prosecutions; quality assurance activities by hospitals, other providers, employers, and medical societies; and medical liability suits. The conclusions of a study published in 1993 remain true today: "At this point, confidence that ·medical licensure boards are capable of systematicallyidenti:tyingincompetentpractitioners, and that board interventions can address the problems caused by such practitioners, are probably misplaCed." 74 · In short, the primary government interest invoked to justify the preponderance standard appears to be little at issue under any standard of proof.
respect for the civil justice system stems. at least in part, :from the notion that the government wiU not sanction citizens without elear justification. Protecting the public from financial, as opposed to physical or psychological, harm is a weak justification for facilitating relatively easy convictions under a preponderance standard. This is not to say that financial fraud is not an important social problem. 75 However, most of the costs of medical care are covered by insurance, and private and governmental insurers have the resources, incentives, and mechanisms to police physician financial misconduct. These mechanisms include a panoply of fraud and abuse laws at both the federal and state levels. 76 Although it is an issue that merits research, it might well be that most physician disciplinary board proceedings concerning financial misconduct are started because of prior proceedings initiated by other governmental authorities rather than complaints from the general public. 77 If so, board proceedings would seem to be redundant.
Maintaining respect for the medical profession also seems like a weak justification in favor of use of a preponderance standard. It is difficult to understand why this has even been mentioned as a governmental interest. The most that can be said in favor of this interest is that the public conceivably will only feel secure, and therefore best benefit from medical treatment, if it respects physicians generally. It can be argued, to the contrary, that patients better protect themselves through a healthy skepticism and inquiring attitude toward medical professionals.
A final state interest that might be suggested to support the preponderance standard is preventing administrative inconvenience or expense. This too is an issue that might merit research. However, what little practical or logical argument that exists suggests that use of the clear and convincing standard will not cause significant administrative inconvenience or expense. Consider the Santosky Court's observations concerning use of_ the clear and convincing standard in parental termination proceedings: "[A] stricter standard of proof would reduce factual error without imposing substantial fiscal burdens upon the State ... 35 States already have adopted a higher standard by statute or court decision without apparent effect on the speed, form, or cost of their factfinding proceedings. " 78 Although only about a quarter of the states use the clear and convincing standard, there has been no indication that these states have experienced any significant increase in inconvenience or expense. To the contrary, as indicated below, the state with
